
A Transforming Attitude Towards Client in Social Work: the Praxis of the Antioch School of Anthropology and Theology

Transformējoša attieksme pret klientu sociālajā darbā: Antiohijas antropoloģijas un teoloģijas skolas prakse

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This article is an analysis of the historical roots and ethical semantics of the social work concept “a marginal person – client” (the Greek words *ξένος*, *ksenos*, and *αστος*, *astos*). The question is relevant in modern social work in relation to the concept of “strange” or “marginal”. Article analyses how the concepts “strange/ other/ marginal” have re-entered the modern world from the ancient world, as they were used in the ancient Syria (4th cent.), Greece, as well as in the medieval Europe. However, nowadays in social work theory they should be described anew using the discourses of social work and anthropology. The article explores the question of how to communicate with the “other” or marginal person, based on reciprocity and internal solidarity.

Key words: social work client, history of social work, marginal person, human anthropology.

Introduction

This article is an analysis of the historical roots and ethical semantics of the social work concept “a marginal person – client” (the Greek words *ξένος*, *ksenos*, and *αστος*, *astos*). The concept is used neither in the sense of the American sociologist Robert E. Park, nor in the context of the OECD report. (Schleicher, 2014). It is used with the understanding that its substance is at least 2000 years old. It is used within an ancient theoretical framework in which marginalization is perceived neither in relation to the social performance of a person; nor in comparison of their social capacity to that of others; nor as a status in relation to one’s income. Instead, it is understood as a person’s own perception of their life, in which they analyse and evaluate their experience. For this reason, historically the concept of marginality has designated the interior experience of a person, of which others might not be aware. It is the internally-felt and experienced attitude that is received from other people. Because of it, a person perceives themselves as excluded, rejected, different/other, marginal.

The concepts “strange/ other/ marginal” have re-entered the modern world from the ancient world. They were used in the ancient Syria, Greece, as well as in the medieval Europe. However, today, as these concepts are used in the discourses of social work and anthropology, they should be described anew in the context of social work theory.

The ethical archetypes for working with a marginal person within the client-oriented social work have been provided in the texts of the ancient Antioch School (John Chrysostom, 347–407, Theodoret of Cyrrus, 393–457, Ephrem the Syrian, 306–379, and others). These texts, together with the works of the Alexandrian and ancient Greek thinkers, form the foundation for ethical protonorms in social work. The contemporary author of the concept of protonorm, Canadian philosopher and anthropologist Charles Taylor (1931), says that every person exists “in normative moral space. A protonorm is basis for human conversation so that it can be carried out within a framework of truth, instead of delusion or lies. A protonorm is related to the maintenance of value aspects and avoidance of humiliation in conversation.” (Rotman, 2016; Hoffer, 2014) What he describes, basically is the concept of philoxenia formulated by the Antioch School. Philoxenia (from Greek *φιλοξενία*, *filoksenia*, literally “love of strangers or foreigners”) or “presence” and “hospitality” are the ethical protonorms in work with a client who is in a crisis situation. They can foster significant changes in them. These concepts continue to be relevant in contemporary understanding of social activation. The concept of proxenia (from Greek *προξενία*, literally “those who treat strangers well”) names the foundations of substance of the client-oriented work. The ancient *proxeni* were the first “social workers” who helped their clients with practically applied anthropological knowledge based on holistic approach. (Ascetical Homilies of St. Isaac the Syrian, 2011).

In the contemporary theory of social work, the problem of the attitude towards “the other” is a significant issue. “The other” is a fundamental category in human thinking since its very beginning. No social group can identify itself without naming the parameters of the “otherness”. The concept of the other has also introduced a new paradigm in the history of philosophy. “The other” was introduced to the modern society by American sociologist George H. Mead in his classical work “Mind, Self and Society” (Mead, 1934). Today “the other” is central to the sociological analysis as the identities of both the majority and minority are being constructed. Sociologists focus on the social identities which reflect certain social categories: culture, gender, class, etc. These social categories affect our ideas about the way in which we want or are able to perceive other people.

The ideas of similarity and otherness are important in a conversation of a social worker with their client. During it, the client can gain the sense of identity and social belonging because, as philosopher Emmanuel Levinas argues, both the Self and the Other form an ethical unit and, in it, the Self forms its identity. “A mutual dialogue can take place on this ethical foundation because the Self is more responsible for the Other than vice versa. The Self and the Other are mutually complementary in a conversation.” (Sarukkai, 1997).

This approach to work with clients has already been developed by the Antioch School of theological anthropology and exegesis (according to the 4th century authors, Antioch was “the capital of Eastern wisdom”, located in the contemporary Syria). In the antiquity, the question of “the other” and “marginal” was not asked in the context of human discrimination or exclusion, but it was considered as an anthropological problem. It was to be understood as a practical possibility of attitude of pushing off the other person or perceiving them from a distance. The concepts of marginal and

the other (or strange) were considered and used as synonyms because their meaning originates in the strategy of distancing which should be restrained and overcome in human relationships.

Every person forms their personality and identity in openness to the other person - this is a contemporary thesis of Martin Heidegger. It is recognized in ontology, epistemology, communication and social sciences. But still, in reality, a reverse tendency can be observed: a desire to distance, to withdraw, to seclude oneself from others. It creates a deformed perception of the other which then takes place of the real person.

The German philosopher Bernhard Waldenfels (1934) defines the phenomenon of delimitation by summing up its three main aspects:

1. A person who is outside the sphere of ownness (Latin: *externum*, English: *foreign*);
2. A person who belongs to a different group (English: *alien*);
3. A person who is different, heterogeneous (English: *strange*).

In the process of delimitation or distancing, the first aspect is the most important. It is a person who is outside the sphere of ownness. This understanding, often used by professionals, treats a person as an object. It asks, "Would I like to have it for myself?" Then the "strange/ other/ marginal" is that which I do not want to have for myself. (Вальдерфелс, 1999). It is a person whom I should help but I see them as somebody who needs only to be responded to. The need for response becomes the foundation for a new phenomenological approach to working with clients. It means that the so-called responsive phenomenology is dominating. Its roots are well described by Edmund Husserl in his concept of Angst/ anger/ nervousness. If the other person is perceived as marginal/ other/ strange, as somebody who needs "only to be responded to", then the responsive forms of phenomenology are sufficient. (Husserl, 1991). But the conversation is not meaningful and there is no understanding of the other person's situation. Responsive phenomenology does not require to understand or to explore client's situation. These tasks are substituted by responsiveness or "quasi-dialogue" in which the "strange/ other /marginal" receives a formal answer instead of a meaningful dialogue.

Currently the differentiation of the "strange/ other/ marginal" is dissolving because in each of them something "dangerous" or "evil" is hidden. A truly "strange" client is one with whom a professional would not like to enter into a dialogue and probe into their personality. The neutrality between a professional and their client is dissolving, their attitude becomes emotional and is based on subjective emphases. An illusionary hierarchy of values emerges: "one's own" emerges who is both different from the "strange/ other/ marginal" and also "higher", "of greater value" and more "proper". As this attitude increases, the "strange" easily becomes an enemy.

Communication with the "other", a marginal person, is a movement of internal solidarity of humanity. Of course, not every client is "a marginal person". However, every client is the "other" and thus they can become the "strange(r)".

In the administrative language these concepts tend to shift towards psychological opinions about clients which then become foundational to the linguistic acts of social workers. It appears that modern social work does not have its own discourse. Clients are labeled as "people with communication handicap", "psychologically disturbed persons", "emotionally and mentally split people" etc. Sociologists, in their turn, point out that "the other", "marginal" clients are "persons who are in the care of social services", and it is "difficult to enter into a dialogue" with them because of their "social isolation and exclusion". At times it is emphasized that they are "professionally marginal" and therefore they should be considered "subjects with communication handicap"; in

conversations with them, “ethical difficulties and barriers” emerge. Some legal sociologists suggest developing “new, innovative communication models for the clients of social services, which methodologically are based on the communication difficulties with them, because a special communicative competence is needed.” (Di Fabio, Palazzeschi, 2016).

At the beginning of our era, a unique interdisciplinary approach to human personality significantly and conceptually contributed to the exploration of the interaction with the “strange/ other/ marginal”. It was formulated and implemented by the so-called “expert anthropologists”, exegetes and historians of Syria (with Antioch being a significant center of culture and education in the ancient Syria). Their anthropological insights have provided the European civilization with a formulation of ethical protonorms and an approach to social activation of human beings. Such outstanding personalities as Ephrem the Syrian, John Crystostom, Isaac the Syrian (613–700) and others developed classical anthropology from the 4th to the 7th century AD, contributing to the Eastern Christian anthropology which then re-entered the Western thought in the Middle Ages. Their contribution is invaluable to the development of the modern human sciences. It has been embedded into the world philosophy as an exceptionally significant scientific foundation of anthropology as a science and of the humanist ideas in the European culture.

The Antiochian anthropologists address problems from the perspective of realistic humanism, building on the anthropological tradition of Aristotle and Plato which conceives person holistically, as a unity of spirit, soul and body. They formulate answers to such questions as, “What is a person? What is their self-awareness? Self-sufficiency? What are their various addictions and the ways of healing them?” They verbalize an understanding of the infinity of human creative capacity and reflect on such issues as human death and immortality.

The Antioch School of anthropology conceives the concepts of “strange/ other/ marginal”, namely, “one who should be helped, or a client” within the ethical paradigm of stewardship or economy (from Greek οἰκονομία, oikonomia). Not welcoming and accepting the other in the “common space of stewardship” is considered as not looking into their face, as it happens in the so-called professional approach where “a human being is forgotten, and a person fights only with themselves”. (Бажанов, 1907). Every client is “the other” and “the strange(r)”, not somebody who has not joined the socio-economic system. This is a truly innovative approach to the marginal or the other person in the history of social work which is possibly worth considering in the context of the so-called problem-oriented social work.

The research conducted by S. M. Rose in 1985 and 1992 (Rose, 1985; Rose, 1992) with several focus groups of social work clients shows that clients are not satisfied with their interaction with professionals of social services for the following reasons:

1. There is an abyss between the client’s world and the world represented by social worker. They are two different lives and lifestyles. Clients suggest that changes are needed in the life perception of professionals.
2. During discussion in the focus groups, clients point out that they need mostly encouragement towards choice and personal support in specific choice situations, not general help. They need understanding and a conversation which shows it.
3. Clients describe social workers as lacking trustworthiness and empathy.
4. Clients note that social workers treat them as “static categories”. At times stigmatizing language is used, especially, if client is an addict or long-time unemployed. It seems paradoxical to clients that social workers do not anticipate positive results but, instead, foresee preset negative results in client’s life.

The consequences of anthropological and ethical aspects in the practice of social work often are negative. It is clear that social workers need anthropological knowledge in their conversations with clients so they can plan for change. From the perspective of anthropology, social work practice should be called *praxis potential* - “praxis of potential” (from Greek *φρόνησις*, *fronēsis*, “wisdom” or “intelligence which releases positive praxis”, namely, it is a method which gives the desired result in social work). (Prabakaran, 2011). In the client-oriented social work, the ethics of communication with clients is principally important because it has consequences for the social activation of clients towards positive results.

The contribution of Syrian anthropologists, in this context, is very significant. The conclusion that “innovative communication models should be developed” by itself leads nowhere. The crisis of human identity continues to deepen and becomes a more pressing problem in the modern so-called risk society. It is crucial to understand in practical terms how to “renew the anthropological framework of social cohesion, solidarity, “one’s own” and “the other”. (Rose, 1985). It is important to activate those practical approaches from the previous centuries which have been tested and proved effective. Modern social work has developed in three stages: 1) social work as an ethical and moral position, 2) as a therapeutic striving, and 3) modern social work which develops as a management work or project. But, before it, in the ancient world, social work started as a free-will service, as an expression of human solidarity and charity. It was both a freely-willed commitment and an obligation to address the impact of social problems on people. It existed many centuries before the Industrial Revolution. In the ancient empirical practice, “social work” was based on the ontological anthropology.

Historical Origins of the Concepts “Marginal” and “Other”

The ancient Antioch School of exegesis, anthropology and theology is a treasury of knowledge for the European Christian civilization. The Antioch School developed its interdisciplinary approach to man by bringing together anthropological, philosophical, metaphysical, social, biological and theological insights. Its versatility of wisdom and ethical erudition was attuned to the issues of its time. It also is attuned to the issues of Europe, conceptually growing into the European understanding of humanity.

The Greek word *ksenos* (ξένος) is difficult to translate because it contains several dimensions of meaning. (Lidell, Scott, 1996). Thus “a client” is:

The first dimension of meaning: a person who is strange, different, barbaric, eccentric.

The second dimension of meaning: a person whom I do not know, someone from “outside”, delimited and delimiting themselves, poor.

The third dimension of meaning: a stranger but a dear guest.

The fourth dimension of meaning: a guest who has come to get something and should be welcome with honor; one to whom I should be present.

The first dimension of meaning: Client as “the strange, different, barbaric”. These meanings are supplemented by such descriptions as “incomprehensible” and “complex”. In the antiquity, the application of this dimension of meaning to clients was considered an ethical violation because it treats persons as “specimens” or “objects”. They bother or disturb; when relating to them, distance should be maintained. Thus, a person is perceived in an illegitimate way - as an individual, not as a personality. The conversation with them is conducted in a formal way, anticipating disassociation from everything that could be mutual or solidary binding.

The main characteristic of a personality is their awareness of the special value of their uniqueness, difference from others. A personality, according to the great theologian Vladimir Lossky, is “the non-conformity of a human to the nature, because the main [characteristic] of a personality is a self-awareness which allows humans make choices.” (Лосский, 1997).

In order to designate the uniqueness of a human being, the concepts of “person” and “personality” are used. They are opposite to the concepts of “individual” or “nature”. An individual is a representative of a class, expressed by quantity (for example, “a wolf is an individual from a wolf pack). If a human being is called an individual, then they are perceived as an animal living in a group. However, in the European anthropological tradition, every human being is a personality, and it implies their freedom, sovereignty, their “I” in differentiation from all others, independence and authority, orientation towards their internally-held values - instead of those enforced from outside. Self-confidence is foundational to a personality; but an individual does not possess it. (Лосский, 1995; Shmally, 2005; Buss, 1995; Emery, 2011).

To perceive a human being just as an individual means to violate the basic ethical premise which lays at the foundation of the humanist convictions of the previous centuries. Then the ethical canons of the humanity start to seem insufficiently universal; a professional can view them in the order of decreasing significance and call them a matter of “taste” or “professional etiquette”. Indeed - how is it possible that we work distantly with a uniformly “professional” approach to the other person and consider it a norm? In the antiquity, it was mandatory to see one’s client as a personality, as a special value, one who cannot ethically be given a formal answer. The concept of a client denotes a human being who is in need of assistance on their road towards self-awareness and social functioning. “Client” means a free person who listens to the other person because they themselves are not aware of their rights and are depended on a patron or protector.

The second dimension of meaning: Client as somebody “standing aside”, “pushed aside”, “poor”. John Chrysostom demonstrates why one’s poverty should not be looked upon negatively, because “worse is a person who desires many goods and begins to judge another person by his own attitude to goods”, seeing in their client nothing more than “an aside-standing object who has few goods”. (Творения св. отца Иоанна Златоуста, 1903) He continues, “Wherever we go - to the marketplace, square at the city center, to some island or dry land, royal apartments or citizen councils - everywhere people are preoccupied with mundaneness; everybody, completely everybody, thinks about their *koilia* – the main measure of a person is their stomach. And if a stomach is empty and a person is poor, is there anything else you can say? Only aside-standing, only marginal? Is the measure of a person the number of horses in his stable or how many horses he possesses and in what kind of carriage he rides? Or is a person measured by a line of camels in his herd? What if he possesses nothing? How shall you look at him? How shall you describe him and understand him? - Does everybody just think of their stomach as the deepest, the most insatiable part of their body? And that is all? What shall I eat, drink, how shall I dress my stomach? If somebody cannot do it, he is a stranger, because he cannot do what each of you can; he then is a stranger and simply marginal?!” (Ibid).

The Syrian anthropologists’ ethical perspective of an egoistic, complacent person is intolerant: poor is the person who does not see the other person as a personality, worthy of admiration. They also conclude that the so-called righteous people are used to conceive others as “objects with faults”.

In practical social work, a marginal person “highlights” the pitiful state of a professional’s ethical world. A professional is social active and knows how to settle in comfortably, but perceives the other person as eccentric or marginalized, only because they experience a life crisis.

The Syrian anthropologists emphasize ethical significance of poverty: “Poor is not he whose pockets are empty and clothes worn out, but he in whom you, upon meeting him, could not awaken or see dreams.” “Poverty is the mother of wisdom; many marginal people are wiser and more honest than the rich, wealthy, knowledgeable”. (Бажанов, 1907). At times a soul of a poor person is like gold, hidden under rags. Truly poor is the person who wants the other person to own many goods.

The third dimension of meaning: Client and presence per se. Proxenia (from Greek *προξενία*, *proxenia*) is presence - this was the name of client-oriented social work at the dawn of our civilization. “Presence”, “unconditional acceptance” and “hospitality” were imperative towards the strange, other, marginal personality. This attitude was implemented in the preparation of special rooms for welcoming “strangers”. In this way, specialized social work institutions were developed where proxeni - first social workers - worked by embodying the presence. First of all, they took care of their clients’ participation in the religious life because they saw every person as a spiritual being: the ability and inability of one’s soul and body derive from the power of the person’s Spirit. Proxeni also explained person’s social and political rights to them. In Syria, then in Greece and later in Europe *proxeni* were highly esteemed; this work was taken up even by the leading politicians. (Smith, Smith. A Compendious Syriac Dictionary, 1957). In the following periods, the professionals of these institutions were replaced by a more centralized office which was disconnected from citizens. The phenomenon of *proxenia* continued in Europe for a long time and became an integral part of the Church and its life. Institutions were developed for “the strange and those living on the margins” as places for special spiritual and soul care.

John Chrysostom described this work during the period of Constantinople (400–405). (Пентковский, 2002). Then the significant concepts for the European sociology and social work - the concepts of mutuality and presence - were clarified. This work was described by the Greek word *λειτουργία* – liturgy, outlining the main obligation of state and city, “The connection of goodness and generosity among people, giving and receiving help without judging anybody for what they possess or do not possess.”

The fourth dimension of meaning: Client and presence as an ethical norm, philoxenia and xenophobia. The concept of philoxenia is understood as a social work protonorm “to be present” with the other person, “to implement the charitable attitude towards every guest”. In Syrian language, the construction *rahem aksnaye* means “an eccentric - my friend”. (Smith, Smith. A Compendious Syriac Dictionary, 1957). “Presence” is understood as an unconditional acceptance of the “stranger, poorer, other person” without any judgment and discussion of reasons for their life problems. Presence is the awareness that “the same or even something worse can happen to me, too”. Presence, from the perspective of the Syrian anthropologists, is *filantropia* (from Greek *φιλανθρωπία*, literally “love of mankind”). Its opposite is *misoxenia* (from Greek *μίσος των ξένων*, literally “hate of strangers”) which is an ethically impermissible “looking at one’s client from above”, imagining that “I know what they need”. *Misoxenia* is expressed as one’s inability to perceive the other person as a being created by God. *Xenophobia* is a concept of hate anthropology; it describes a setting where the goal is not to understand the outline of client’s life but to come to them with hate which can accidentally be expressed in unkind, dismissive phrases. Instead, clients should be perceived as those “blessed by my Father” (Matthew 25:34-36).

Ephrem the Syrian writes that we “must not work for a marginal person but together with him, in unity with him, acknowledging goodness which is neither sentiment, nor emotion but an ethical value: YOU are significant to me!” (Hymns and Homilies of St. Ephraim the Syrian, 2012) Every client has a desire for spiritual fulfillment in life; in this way humans differ from animals that have only physical needs. When spiritual needs are not met, people experience undefinable anxiety. The main spiritual need of a personality is a need for mutuality and security. It is provided by a proper ethical attitude to them. As Ephrem the Syrian writes, “All that is needed is to accept a human as he is. Acceptance is an unobtrusive presence, human warmth, mutuality. It is an attitude which does not demand immediate change. I accept and listen to the thoughts and feelings of the other person as though he is both my guest and host at the same time. The other person feels this warmth, and it provides a foundation for his self-worth: “I might be worthy of somebody’s love... I must start with myself.”

It might seem that the ancient anthropologists issued a call for altruism. But it was not so; their logic is more complex. For them, presence has a different ethical substance. It is well revealed in Homer’s “Iliad”: Glaucus and Diomedes meet in the battle field, and all suddenly they realize that they are both human, they both belong to the family of humans (not gods). Diomedes closes their interaction with these words: “So now I am your host and friend in the heart of Argos, you are mine in Lycia when I visit in your country.” (Homer, 1991) It is followed by exchange of gifts that, according to the researchers, was an obligatory condition of hospitality if they wanted to establish mutual trust.

“You looked at me, a stranger; you wanted to be beside me for a moment,” writes John Chrysostom, “God will make you a citizen of the heaven”. (Бажанов, 2007). Why? Because “one’s own” and “the strange / other” merge together in the ethical norm of presence as the two sides of a coin. Presence gives strength to the weakest because, at the social level, mutuality is implemented with the purpose of “helping you so that, from now on, you can help yourself”. Today this task of supporting client’s abilities is called “subsidiary presence”. (Katuvinec, 2007). It fosters the direction of a person towards the common good. “Everyone who in a democratic, civil society desires to receive support and help, should not be allowed to become a passive receiver from the state. A person should be involved in a community essentially, not formally or administratively. They should feel presence and the other person’s interest in their situation... For this reason, the principle of subsidiarity is an important principle in the European Union’s mission to serve its every citizen,” writes M. Katuvinec, the senior researcher at The European Centre for Workers' Questions. (Katuvinec, 2007).

In the contemporary research, this approach is being developed by synergic anthropology which enquires into philosophical and transdisciplinary concepts of how humans perceive the other person and what are possible results of openness towards the other. It is a universal paradigm as anthropology is becoming the foundation for social work. (Horujy, 2021; Maksimova, Fedotova, 2017). Research shows that client’s experience of interaction with others settles in their consciousness, its sums up, archives and develops a peculiar “person’s own resume of themselves”, some quintessence of themselves. It can be called the foundation of client’s self-identity which they possess internally. At the same time, every human being has a need for meaningful communication. It can play a significant part in the awakening of their social activity - but with a condition that a professional is able to synergically “open” their client’s possibilities of the “potential personality” - those which form the foundation of human self-identity. The possible - the other / different - in a client is “the possibilities which are wrapped up in a bundle in their personality”. (Делез, 1999).

This is a fundamental attitude in the work with clients, it is a “*le singulier*” (French for “unique, extraordinary”) competence of opening. The social ability or inability of one’s client is directly related to the attitude towards them as a singularity or a unique personality. Presence releases the potential of energy in a person. “To be together” is a competence of being solidary, a cultural fact which makes a human being to recognize the value of their own personality. But a formally administrative approach awakens in a person “deadly desire to escape”, as Isaac the Syrian puts it. (Ascetical Homilies, 2011).

In the interaction of a social worker with their client, the quality of dialogue is very important. In the client-oriented social work, both social inclusion and understanding of truth are significant. Of course, if the social work is performed within the concept of management (Ferguson, 2001; Jordan & Jordan, 2000; Lymbery, 2001; Lorenz, 2001; Dominelli, 1997) which is dominated by empirical practice and system management, the opinion of the client-personality, their life values and culture are often subjected to reduction because the social work options are limited by fixed and standardized formulas. (Prabarkan, 2011).

The Strange (Greek *ksenos*) Is the Host (Latin *hospes*): An Ethical Paradox in Working with a Client

The rich ethical semantics of the Greek word *ξενος*, *ksenos* (“strange”, “marginal”) includes also the meanings of “guest” and “host”. Anybody who comes for help, is a guest. Guest should be welcomed with hospitality. How? Both these words express the paradoxical substance of presence. When working with a marginal person, “winners” should be both client and professional. The weakest should awaken the wisdom in the other’s heart, and vice versa. (Бажанов, 2007).

The Antiochian anthropologists believe that hospitality towards one’s client is measured not by the number of office hours but by one’s respectful attitude to them and care for them. Theodoret of Cyrrus points out that, in the Old Testament, the owner of the house, or the host, did not order his servants to meet the stranger or beggar but instead met them himself. *Philoxenia*, first and foremost, is openness and honesty towards one’s client, towards “the strange(r)”. It is a mutuality and exchange with a hope-giving solidarity. When these ethical protonorms are present in one’s professional stance towards their client, they release the professional for strategical action and give a direction to social change in their client’s life.

Conclusions

The professional culture of modern social work should not neglect and deny its cultural heritage. It transmits into the contemporary practice of social work the foundational codes and norms that in the course of history have proved themselves as the axioms of human mutuality.

We live some 1500 years after the time when the Antiochian anthropologists, in their analytical manner, reflected on the work with clients and the importance of ethical protonorms. Such foreign words as *xenos*, *proxenia*, *filoxenia*, *misoxenia* and others sound strange to our modern ears, but these concepts are in the “lifeblood” of the European nations and they significantly influence the professional culture of the European social work. It should be reiterated that these concepts are foundational to the modern concepts of mutuality, reciprocity and solidarity.

The approach which we can learn from the Antioch School, can also become ethically effective and fruitful in the paradigm of social work in Latvia for several reasons. First, it emphasizes that it is ethically impermissible to depersonalize a person and to standardize one's subjective opinion. Second, it points to the mutuality by exchanging gifts: knowledge, time, trust and mutual enrichment. Third, it shows how presence anticipates mutual obligation and excludes ignorance and arrogance in one's attitude towards their client. Finally, it fosters awareness that the task of a professional is to provide to their client the common fraternity of humanity in the deepest sense of the word.

The client-oriented approach, based on the ethical protonorms, leads us to consider how, in our conversations with clients, we could reach deeper, beyond their psychological identity. Every person is a paradox: clients know that they are different, that they have encountered difficulties but they long for security and mutuality, for a respectful attitude towards them. Every client is a suffering human being, and it is the professional's presence and hospitality that can help in their social activation. Presence and hospitality are essentially therapeutical and social.

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Transformējoša attieksme pret klientu sociālajā darbā:

Antiohijas antropoloģijas un teoloģijas skolas prakse

Raksts analizē sociālā darba koncepta “klients - margināla persona” vēsturiskās saknes un ētisko semantiku (grieķu val. *ξένος, ksenos*, un *αστός, astos*). Jautājums ir nozīmīgs mūsdienu sociālajā darbā saistībā ar jēdzieniem “svešinieks” jeb “margināls”. Raksts iztirzā to, kā šie jēdzieni ir ienākuši mūsdienu lietojumā no senatnes tā, kā tie tikuši lietoti senajā Sīrijā (4.gs.), Grieķijā un viduslaiku Eiropā. Mūsdienu sociālajā darbā tos nepieciešams aprakstīt no jauna sociālā darba un antropoloģijas diskursā. Raksts iztirzā, kā komunicēt ar “citādo” jeb marginālo cilvēku, balstoties solidaritātē un savstarpībā.

Atslēgas vārdi: sociālā darba klients, sociālā darba vēsture, margināla persona, antropoloģija.



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